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The judicially created doctrine of pedis possessio has long been
a tenet of public land law. Curiously, however, the courts have seldom
spoken on the application of this doctrine to a group of claims based
upon a claimant's work on less than all of the claims in the group. This
article considers generally the application of pedis possessio in such
a manner and specifically a recent federal district court decision so
applying the doctrine.

NEW FRONTIERS IN PEDIS POSSESSIO:
MAC GUIRE V. STURGISt
Kent R. Olson*

Q

N

June 3, 1971, the United States District Court for the

District of Wyoming' held, in Conclusion of Law No. 8
therein, that the locator of certain uranium claims on the
public domain was

presently' entitled to the exclusive possession thereof on a group or area basis where

. . .

the following

tThe author's interest in Mac Guire v. Sturgis, Civil No. 5523 (D. Wyo.,
June 3, 1971) is partially attributable to his position as co-counsel in the
case with Houston G. Williams, Esq. of Casper, Wyoming.
*Attorney, Legal Department, Continental Oil Company, Denver, Colorado;
B.A. 1961, Augustana College (Ill.); J.D. 1965, Harvard University; Member
of the Colorado and Illinois Bars. Mr. Olson is the author of Enkla Bolag
and Partnerships: A Comparison of the Statutory Basis of Partnership
Law in Sweden and the United States (Stockholm 1969). Mr. Olson acknowledges his indebtedness to Mrs. Katherine Gurule for her secretarial
skills in the preparation of this article.
1. Mac Guire v. Sturgis, Civil No. 5523 (D. Wyo., June 3, 1971). This lawsuit initially was filed by the plaintiff, Mac Guire, in the District Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Converse County, Wyoming, pursuant to the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of the State of Wyoming, sections
1-1049 to 1-1064, but was removed by the defendant, Sturgis, to said
federal court. Mac Guire, before filing this action, had contracted with
Continental Oil Company (Conoco) to locate these claims in his name and
at a later date assign the same to Conoco for a consideration. No appeal
has been taken in this case.
2. The final sentence in Conclusion of Law No. 8 limits Mac Guire's future
exclusive possession thereof to "so long as he, or his successors in title,
remain in possession thereof, working diligently towards a discovery."
Copyright 0 1972 by the University of Wyoming
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exists or was done for his benefit: (a) the geology
of the area claimed is similar and the size of the
area claimed is reasonable ;4 (b) the discovery (validation) work referred to in Wyo. Stat. § 30-6 (1957)
is completed;5 (c) an overall work program is in
effect for the area claimed ;6 (d) such work program
is being diligently pursued, i.e., a significant number
of exploratory holes have been systematically
drilled ;7 and (e) the nature of the mineral claimed
and the cost of development would make it economically impracticable to develop the mineral if the lo3. In Finding of Fact No. 5, the court found that
[t]he geology of the area . . . is low dipping sedimentary strata,
cropping out throughout the area, of the Tertiary Wasatch formation. Such strata are fluviatile deposits of lenticular sands, clays
and shale, derived from igneous rocks of the mountainous region
to the south.
4. Mac Guire claimed and was awarded the present, exclusive possession of
1,785 lode claims within a certain area of Converse County, Wyoming.
While a sizeable amount of acreage was thereby awarded, the court apparently felt that Mac Guire's activity (see notes 5 and 7 infra) on all
of these claims, when compared to that of Sturgis', entitled him to the
exclusive possessory right of all in view of Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 278, 189 P.2d 882, 884 (1948), which,
in distinguishing quiet title actions from possessory actions, stated that
'[t]he ordinary rule of law that the plaintiff must recover on the
strength of his own title and not on the weakness of that of his
adversary does not apply. The rule in possessory actions is that
the better title prevails.'
Accord, Ranchers Explor. & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708,
722 n.38 (D. Utah 1965).
5. See Finding of Fact No. 8. This statute requires, inter alia, the performance of certain discovery work by shaft, tunnel, pit or drill hole. Mac
Guire chose to meet this requirement by drilling, on each of these 1,785
claims, one or more holes aggregating at least 50 feet in depth, no such
hole being less than 10 feet in depth. In its strict sense, this work anachronism relates solely to rights based on a "discovery," but, confronted
with trial practicalities and the fact that such work had been done, this
was introduced as further evidence of Mac Guire's compliance with the
diligently-working-towards-discovery element of pedis possessio. It is not
the author's view, and there is nothing suggestive in this court's expressions, verbal or written, that compliance with this statute is necessary
to establishing pedis possessio. Cf. Fiske, Pedis Possessio-Modern Use of
an Old Concept, 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 181, 213-14 (1969).
6. The specific language in Finding of Fact No. 10 is that "[a]ll of the information obtained therefrom was part of a continuing geological evaluation being conducted relative to all of the Mac Guire claims."
7. Apart from the location (discovery) formalities of posting, monumenting,
validating and recording, the court's Finding of Fact No. 10 discloses that
Conoco drilled approximately 150 exploratory holes within a six-mile
radius of three groups of these claims, 30 of such holes being drilled on
these three groups within a two-month period. Cessation of such work at
the end of this period was due to spring thaws and would be recommenced
when the ground had dried. The court also found therein that
[d]uring this period, at which time Conoco had sleeping trailers,
cooking facilities and a field laboratory on the Mac Guire claims,
well cuttings were taken from these holes and examined in the
field, and radiometric logs were run on such holes. Evaluation
of these logs was made in the field and in Conoco's Casper,
Wyoming, office, and analyses of some of said well cuttings were
made in Conoco's laboratories in Ponca City, Oklahoma ....
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cator is awarded only those claims on which he is
actually present and currently working. . .. '
This case represents, to this author's knowledge, the first
judicial holding relative to the question of whether the pedis
possessio doctrine must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis
or can be applied to a group of claims.'
8. Deep exploratory drilling is necessary on these claims before commencing
actual mining operations. The cost of such drilling, including the mechanics
and logging thereof, is approximately $1.00 per foot, and this per foot
cost amounts to approximately $1.60 when employees' salaries and expenses in connection therewith are considered. The number of such holes
to adequately "block out" even a portion of the area embraced by these
claims would be in the neighborhood of 5,000, of which 200 to 1,000, depending on what was encountered during the course of such drilling, would
have to be drilled in the prediscovery stage. Thus, given these more or less
fixed costs and the fact that 98% of the uranium ore reserves in the United
States are sedimentary, embedded deposits rather than veins or lodes in
the traditional sense, costs well in excess of $1,000,000 may be involved
in the pre-discovery stage alone.
9. But cf. K. C. K. Mining Co. v. Senutovich, Civil No. 9072 (Dist. Ct., McKinley County, New Mexico, March 10, 1956), where the conclusions of law
were based on the assumption that this doctrine could be applied to an
entire 640-acre section. Also, some would regard Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337 (1919); Ranchers Explor. & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., supra
note 4, at 721; and Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 247, 327 P.2d 308, 317
1958), as suggesting, if not requiring, a claim-by-claim application. See
Fiske, supra note 5, at 190 & n.26, who notes that the Court in Union Oil
"acknowledged that the doctrine is applicable only on a claim-by-claim
basis," and who, citing Ranchers and Adams v. Benedict, points out that
"the aspects and consequences of pedis possessio enunciated in [Union
Oil] remain valid today"; Foreman, Dwyer & Cox, Judicial Uncertainties
in applying the Mining Doctrine of "Pedis Possessio," 3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 467, 471 (1970), who state that Ranchers "rejected defendants' contention that the doctrine of 'pedis possessio' could be applied
upon a group or area basis rather than a claim-by-claim basis;" Holbrook, Legal Obstacles to Uranium Development, 1 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 325, 346 (1955), who interprets Union Oil as, "in effect,
refus[ing] to recognize group work for annual labor as possession and
diligent prosecution of work essential for pedis possessio and requir[ing]
actual possession and performance of work on each claim for protection
under the doctrine of pedis possessio"; Ladendorff, Enlarging Prediscovery Rights of Mineral Locators, 6 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1, 21 (1961),
who feels that "[i]n view of the holding in the Union Oil Co. case, it can
reasonably be concluded that . . . occupancy and exploration must actually
extend to each claim [and] [lit would not be sufficient that he be drilling
and actually occupying only one claim of a group"; Sherwood & Greer, Possessory Interests in Wyoming Mining Claims, 4 LAND & WATER L. REV.
337, 344 n.24, 346 & n.36 (1969), who regard Union Oil as making it "clear
that pedis possessio requires actual occupancy of each claim," who view
Ranchers as foreclosing any basis on which to hold a block of several
claims by possession of one of them even though operations conducted on
one claim may ultimately lead to a discovery of mineral on more than one,
and who cite that portion of Adams v. Benedict which states that ".... possession of each claim . . . must be protected by actual occupation of that identical
claim and the diligent and persistent exploratory work thereon" (emphasis
added); 2 Twrry & REEVES, LEGAL STUDY OF THE NONFUEL MINERALS RE-

SOURCES 357 (Public Land Law Review Commission Study Report 1969),
who cite Ranchers for the proposition that "[tihe prediscovery rights of
a prospector cannot be extended to more than one claim without an actual
occupancy of an [sic] diligent serach for mineral on each claim"; Waldeck,
Discovery Requirements and Rights Prior to Discovery on Uranium Claims
on the Colorado Plateau, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 404, 419 (1955), who observes that Union Oil "decided that the possession of one of a group of
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Pedis possessio is a judicially created doctrine," whose
origins are romantically suggested by the following excerpt
from Jennison v. Kirk:
The discovery of gold in California was followed,
as is well known, by an immense immigration into
the State, which increased its population within
three or four years from a few thousand to several
hundred thousand. The lands in which the precious
metals were found belonged to the United States,
and were unsurveyed, and not open, by law, to occupation and settlement. Little was known of them
further than that they were situated in the Sierra
five claims with diligent exploratory work thereon will not be treated as
actual possession of more than the claim actually occupied even though
the exploratory work benefited the entire group."
10. The earliest reported mining cases to use the term "possessio pedis" are
Attwood v. Fricot, 17 Cal. 37, 44 (1860); English v. Johnson, 17 Cal. 107,
116 (1860); and Hess v. Winder, 30 Cal. 349, 355, 358 (1866). The first
case, and probably the second, convey an impression that the principal
usage of this term was in an agricultural context, and all three appear to
equate this term with the foothold. Yet, each recognizes that, local mining
rules to the contrary, a mining claimant was not limited to the mere possessio pedia of the claim when such claimant was in actual possession of a
portion of the claim and was claiming the entire claim under an instrument
(color of title) in which the exterior boundaries of the entire claim were
definitely and accurately described. In Grossman v. Pendery, 8 F. 693, 694
(C.C.D. Colo. 1881), the first reported mining case to refer to this doctrine
by name and substance, the issue therein was framed and answered in the
following language:
Can prospectors on the public mineral domain acquire any right
in which the law will protect them prior to the discovery of mineral
in rock in place? And, if so, can plaintiffs, being prior locators,
recover against defendants, who first discovered mineral on the
ground in controversy?
It is the opinion of the court that inasmuch as the plaintiffs
allowed the defendants to enter upon their claim and within their
boundaries and there sink a shaft, in which they discovered mineral
in rock in place before a discovery by plaintiffs, and make location
thereof, without protest, the defendants now have the better right.
But the plaintiffs might have protected their actual possession of
their entire claim by proper legal proceeding prior to the discovery
of mineral by the defendants, or by either party.
A prospector on the public mineral domain may protect himself
in the possession of his pedis possessionis while he is searching for
mineral. His possession so held is good as a possessory title
against all the world, except the government of the United States.
But if he stands by and allows others to enter upon his claim and
first discover mineral in rock in place, the law gives such first
discoverer a title to the mineral so first discovered, against which
the mere possession of the surface cannot prevail....
See Fiske, supra note 5, at 187; Ladendorff, supra note 9, at 11; Sherwood
& Greer, supra note 9, at 347.
11. 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1879). See Fiske, supra note 5, at 186. This article,
in the author's opinion, represents the most thorough analysis of pedis
possessio. An equally well-written, but intentionally more narrow, treatment of this doctrine is to be found in Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9,
at 339-47. Collectively, these two articles, supplemented perhaps by 2
TwiTTY & REEVES, supra note 9, at 353-57, present a comprehensive picture
of this doctrine, and therefore this article will not treat what already has
been well covered.
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Nevada mountains. Into these mountains the emigrants in vast numbers penetrated, occupying the
ravines, gulches and canons, and probing the earth
in all directions for the precious metals. Wherever
they went, they carried with them that love of order
and system and of fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our people. In every district
which they occupied they framed certain rules for
their government, by which the extent of ground
they could severally hold for mining was designated,
their possessory right to such ground secured and
enforced, and contests between them either avoided
or determined. These rules bore a marked similarity, varying in the several districts only according to
the extent and character of the mines; distinct provisions being made for different kinds of mining
such as placer mining, quartz mining, and mining
in drifts or tunnels. They all recognized discovery,
followed by appropriation, as the foundation of the
possessor's title, and development by working as the
condition of its retention. And they were so framed
as to secure to all comers, within practicable limits,
absolute equality of right and privilege in working
the mines. Nothing but such equality would have
been tolerated by the miners, who were emphatically
the lawmakers, as respects mining, upon the public
lands in the State. The first appropriator was
everywhere held to have, within certain well defined
limits, a better right than others to the claims taken
up; and in all controversies, except as against the
government, he was regarded as the original owner,
from whom title was to be traced....
The hallmark of this doctrine is its recognition of the fact
that on-the-ground work, to varying extents, necessarily precedes actual discovery." As such, this doctrine sought to
establish certain ground rules by which certain inequities in
the rights-through-discovery approach of the location laws
could be mitigated and breaches of the peace could be
12. See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, supra note 9, at 346, where the Court observed
that,
[fjor since, as a practical matter, exploration must precede the
discovery of minerals, and some occupation of the land ordinarily
is necessary for adequate and systematic exploration, legal recognition of the pedis possessio of a bona fide and qualified prospector
is universally regarded as a necessity.
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avoided.1 3 These ground rules are succinctly and authoritatively enunciated in Union Oil Co. v. Smith, where the
United States Supreme Court, citing numerous lower court
holdings, affirmed that
upon the public domain a miner may hold the place
in which he may be working against all others having no better right, and while he remains in possession, diligently working towards discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected against forcible, fraudulent, and clandestine
"
intrusions upon his possession ...
This quoted language still constitutes the crux of pedis possessio."
As in other judicially created doctrines, varying and more
complicated fact situations have fostered litigation, thereby
increasing the body of law on this doctrine. In the process,
though, because the courts have seemed inclined to allow each
case to be interpreted on its particular facts,"6 uncertainty
has arisen. The resulting frustration of the attorney, who
must fashion something tangible and practical for his client
out of such uncertainty, is exemplified by one writer who
bemoans the fact that, although courts frequently repeat
language such as this from Union Oil, several questions
remain unanswered.
To what extent must a person occupy a claim in
order to be entitled to such protection? To what
size area does such right extend? What amounts to
a forcible entry or one made in bad faith as distinguished from a permissible peaceful entry upon
the possession of another? ... "
13. See Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 23, 95 P. 849, 855 (1908). Stated in a
contemporaneous context, where large amounts of time and money are
demanded, Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 345, would characterize the
purpose of this doctrine as being "to guarantee to one in possession of
mineral ground an assured land position as against intruders and to encourage him to feel secure in committing his time and resources to mineral development."
14. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, supra note 9, at 346-47.
15. See Ranchers Explor. & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., supra note 4, at 721.
16. See 1 LINDLEY, MINES § 217 (3rd ed. 1914); 2 TwiTTY & REEVES, supra
note 9, at 363; Waldeck, supra note 9, at 419.
17. Waldeck, supra note 9, at 419; See also Fiske, supra note 5, at 187, 209;
Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra note 9, at 472; Holbrook, supra note 9, at
349; 2 TWITTY & REEVES, supra note 9, at 362-63.
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These first two questions touch upon the one presented
and answered affirmatively in Mac Guire v. Sturgis-can one
acquire, under certain circumstances and conditions, the exclusive possessory right to numerous claims even though
the claimant is currently performing physical work towards
discovery on less than all of such claims ? Prior to this case,
greater uncertainty existed, although some undoubtedly
would contend that judicial precedent at least suggested, if
not required, a negative answer.'"
Ironically, Union Oil itself has occasioned some uncertainty in this regard, 9 despite there being no basis in the
Court's holding therefor."0 In that case, the plaintiff had located a 160-acre oil placer claim (A). At that time, the defendant was not in actual possession of A but was in actual
possession of a contiguous 160-acre oil placer claim (B),
upon which the defendant had drilled a well to discovery.
The defendant claimed he had acquired the possessory rights
to A (as well as to four other such claims contiguous to B)
by virtue of his annual assessment work on B, which tended
to determine the oil-bearing character of A and the other
four claims. The Court, however, expressly framed the issue before it as presenting for the first time the question of
the meaning and effect of a 1903 Act entitled "An Act Defining What Shall Constitute and Providing for Assessments on Oil Mining Claims."'" So as to leave no doubt, except collectively among future legal writers, the Court unequivocally stated that
[t]o what extent the possessory right of an explorer
before discovery is to be deduced from the invitation
extended in § 2319 [30 U.S.C. § 22], to what extent
it is to be regarded as a local regulation of the kind
recognized by that section and the following ones,
and to what extent it derives force from the authority of the mining states to regulate the posses18. These writers and the judicial precedent they cite are discussed in note 9,
supra.
19. Compare the interpretations of this case by the writers quoted in note 9,
supra. 2 TWITTY & REEVES, supra note 9, at 357, correctly state the holding in Union Oil.
20. See Comment, A Judicial Approach to Updating the Mining Laws of 1872Pedis Possessio, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 385, 393 (1970).
21. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, supra note 9, at 342, 348.
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sion of the public lands in the interest of peace and
good order, are questions with which we are not now
concerned. Nor need we stop to inquire whether the
right is limited to the ground actually occupied in
the process of exploration, or extends to the limits
of the claim. These questions and others that suggest themselves are not raised by the present record,
which concerns itself solely with the rights asserted
by the defendant under the Act of 1903. .... "
Further, the Court observed that assessment work has "nothing to do with locating or holding a claim before discovery."" Consistent with these statements, the Court held that
the work on B did not confer on the defendant by said Act
inchoate rights in A, of which it was not in possession or
upon which it had made no discovery.2 4
Despite the clarity of this holding and the narrow issue
before the Court, Ranchers Exploration & Development
Co. v. Anaconda Co. cites Union Oil as rejecting the
contention that pedis possessio can be applied on a group or
area basis rather than on a claim-by-claim basis.2" This citation undoubtedly reinforced the view of those who believed
Union Oil suggested or required such a result. Moreover, in
addition to misciting Union Oil, the court compounded this
error of substance by committing a procedural error-devoting a substantial portion of its opinion to dicta. Reduced to
its essence, the facts in Ranchers reveal that the defendants
therein were the claimants of numerous lode claims on some
of which the plaintiff attempted to locate lode claims of its
own. The defendants forcibly prevented the plaintiff from
doing so, and the plaintiff sought, inter alia, injunctive relief, which was opposed by the defendants on the theory, inter
alia, that pedis possessio gave them exclusive possession of
Id. at 348. The Court then immediately and gratuitously notes that
"[w]hatever the nature and extent of a possessory right before discovery,
all authorities agree [citing no authority] that such possession may be
maintained only by continued actual occupancy . . ." (emphasis added).
What the Court meant by "actual" is not entirely free from doubt, but
in any event the statement is dictum.
23. Id. at 350.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Ranchers Explor. & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., supra note 4, at 721 n.35.
Although Union Oil is miscited and the court's discussion of pedis poseessio
is dictum, this opinion nevertheless represents, in this author's view, the
most scholarly and exhaustive judicial treatment of this doctrine.
22.
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these claims. The court found that the defendants were
neither in actual occupancy of nor diligently working towards
discovery on any of these claims; that they did not attempt
to drill a single hole or do any work whatsoever in the
general area, but merely had plans and used guns to keep
others off.26 Given these circumstances, the court quite correctly concluded that the defendants had no pedis possessio
rights, but it failed to recognize that the defendants' contention relative to a group or area application of this doctrine
at that point became moot. If no pedis possessio obtains, a
fortiori no group or area application thereof could obtain.
Similarly, some may regard Adams v. Benedict27 as
precedent for not permitting pedis possessio to be applied on
a group or area basis.28 It is true that this case does contain
the following language which could foster such a conclusion:
The work done on other claims does not supply the
requirement [of being in actual and continuous possession, working diligently towards discovery] ...
Likewise, the possession of each claim .

.

. must be

protected by actual occupation of that identical claim
and the diligent and persistent exploratory work
thereon....
Any knowledge [defendants] had of an overall
plan for the development of the area is immaterial....
...

To hold otherwise would allow a person to hold vast
amounts of land by merely claiming it without doing
the work required by the rules laid down above. It
would encourage speculation and would not allow
the orderly filing of mining claims anticipated by
the law. 9
Yet, even if one assumes that the area or group application
of pedis possessio was before this court as an issue, which is
very doubtful, such language nevertheless is dictum. The
court found that the plaintiffs had allowed the defendants
to enter upon the contested claim peaceably, and that thereafter the defendants were in actual possession of such claim,
working diligently towards discovery thereon, and did not
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 724 and 726.
Supra note 9.
See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 344 n.24.
Adams v. Benedict, supra note 9, at 247, 327 P.2d at 317.
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permit the plaintiffs to peaceably re-enter this claim."° As
such, the defendants would have been entitled to the exclusive
possession thereof, and, a fortiori, the plaintiffs could not
have acquired any possessory right thereto either directly
or by any acts done on any of the other 25 lode claims."'
During the time-span covered by these three cases, the
need for a solution to the problem of how to secure prediscovery possessory rights so as to encourage uranium exploration and development, and correspondingly discourage
claim jumpers and nuisance locators, but without opening the
door to speculation and monopoly, has become more acute
due to the increasing depth at which uranium is found and
the consequent rise in pre-discovery exploratory costs. What
was applicable in 1957, as illustrated by the following excerpt
from Smaller v. Leach, has even greater applicability today:
Uranium itself, particularly the secondary minerals
such as carnotite ... are often subject to thick layers
of overburden. A radiometric anomaly may be
found on the surface and yet no single piece of rock
subjected to the scintillator may react or give a
'count'. This fact has resulted in the custom among
those seeking uranium of staking all of an area that
may be 'hot'; i.e., an area that gives a radioactive
count above the normal background reading caused
by the normal radiations from the earth's crust and
from cosmic rays. Once staking and recording of
location notices have been done, then the expensive
drilling and other searching are begun in earnest.
As a practical matter the prospectors know that the
real bonanza may lie some distance from the 'hot
spot'. They also know that the moment a discovery
is known to the public that others rush in and stake
the surrounding lands, thus many times preventing
the original discoverer from capitalizing on his
efforts... 32
80. Adams v. Benedict, supra note 9, at 240, 247, 327 P.2d at 12, 317.
31. The trial court had found in favor of the plaintiffs as to all 26 claims in
McKinley County, New Mexico, but the defendants challenged the correctness of the trial court's judgment and decree only as to one of these
claims.
32. 136 Colo. 297, 306, 316 P.2d 1030, 1036 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936.
See also Waldeck, supra note 9, at 404-05.
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Many recognize this problem.8 Of these, some feel the problem should be solved legislatively ;" some see an opportunity
for judicial resolution," even though the judiciary heretofore
may have shown little inclination in this respect ;s some apparently offer no solution or feel the present situation is a
lesser evil than other proposed solutions. 7
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that Congress,
in view of its past legislative record in this respect"5 and the
numerous bills currently before it stemming from the Public
Land Law Review Commission's Report, will be inclined to
deal with this problem exclusively in a manner unrelated to
a broad consideration of the 1872 Mining Law. While a solution may result from any sweeping revision of the 1872 Act,
uranium claimants' pre-discovery possessory rights in the
interim, and probably for a time thereafter relative to claims
located prior to the effective date of any such revision, will
remain essentially insecure unless the courts are prepared
to afford relief, as in Mac Guire v. Sturgis, by adapting pedis
possessio to current uranium mining realities. To withhold
such relief would be tantamount to ignoring the existence of
the problem heretofore described; the express statutory invitation to explore on the public domain;9 the underlying
policy of Congress to encourage the maximum utilization of
the mineral resources thereon;4 the absence of any stare
33. See Fiske, supra note 5, at 210-11, 214 n.90, and 216; Forman, Dwyer &
Cox, supra note 9, at 469; Holbrook, supra note 9 at 349, 350; Ladendorff,
supra note 9, at 4-6, 20-21; Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Laws in an
Atomic Age: A Case for Reform, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 375, 380 (1955);
Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 339, 346-47; 2 TwiTrY & REEVES,
supra note 9, at 362-63; Waldeck, supra note 9, at 405; 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF MINING § 4.9 (1971); Comment, supra note 20, at 393-94; PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 124-25 (1970).
34. See Forman, Dwyer & Cox, supra note 9, at 472-74; Ladendorff, supra
note 9, at 21, 25-33; Martz, supra note 33, at 383; 2 TWITi'Y & REEVES,
supra note 9, at 362-63.
35. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 33; Comment, supra note 20,
at 394-95.
36. See Fiske, supra note 5, at 211-12, 216.
37. See Holbrook, supra note 9, at 356; Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at
347, 371-73; Waldeck, supra note 9, at 423.
38. See Ladendorff, supra note 9, at 22-23; Sales, Geophysical Mining Claims,
3 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 395 (1957).
39. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, supra note 9, at 346.
40. See Fiske, supra note 5, at 185 n.10, 211, 216; Sherwood & Greer, supra
note 9, at 340, 371-72. In this context, it is noteworthy that Congress in
enacting 30 U.S.C. §§ 641-46 (1970), relative to low interest loans to be
made available to private enterprise for mineral exploration, declared it
to be the policy of Congress, in the recital clause thereof (Pub. L. No. 85-
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decisis to the contrary," and, indeed, the fact that the judiciary has created this doctrine,4 2 based on earlier Western
mining district customs, 3 and has not regarded it as a fossilized curiosity."
Zollars v. Evans, while recognizing that" [o]n the public
domain of the United States a miner may hold the place in
which he may be working against all others having no better
right," nevertheless required a miner, "when he assert[ed]
title to a full claim of 1,500 feet in length and 300 feet in
width, [to] prove a lode extending throughout the claim." 4
Yet, this strict "foothold" application of pedis possessio was
rejected by Field v. Gray46 in favor of awarding possession
to the entire claim. In United States v. Grass Creek Oil &
Gas Co., 7 the placing of a caretaker upon the contested lands
and the making of a verbal contract for drilling wells thereon
constituted the only work relative to such lands before the
critical date of May 6, 1914," and yet this was deemed to be

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

701, Aug. 21, 1958), "to stimulate exploration for minerals within the
United States, its Territories and possessions." Outside of a purely pedis
possessio context, this Congressional policy relative to the supply of energy
from public domain lands might have to be balanced against the national
environmental policy found in the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). Consideration of these different policies,
though, is beyond the scope of this article.
See earlier discussion herein relative to Union Oil, Ranchers and Adams v.
Benedict, supra note 9.
See note 10, supra, in this connection.
See Fiske, supra note 5, at 186.
See Fiske, supra note 5, at 188; Ladendorff, supra note 9, at 2; Waldeck;
supra note 9, at 406; Comment, supra note 20, at 385.
5 F. 172, 173 (C.C.D. Colo. 1880). This restrictive view of pedis possessio
was supported in the later case of Gemmel v. Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 335, 72
P. 662, 663 (1903).
1 Ariz. 404, 408-09, 25 P. 793, 794 (1881). Cf. Crossman v. Pendery, supra
note 10. This liberal view was widely followed in the oil placer cases arising
in California and Wyoming, the rationale for which is described in Fiske,
supra note 5, at 188.
Deep deposits were sought, and the search required more sophisticated technology utilized over a wider area to narrow the exploration program to the places where drilling seemed most promising. Consequently, the prospecting parties needed protection
while they worked upon larger tracts in different ways than had
been customary for shallow deposits, and those tracts or claims
had to be defined specifically before discovery of minerals took
place.
It is submitted that similar rationale exists today relative to uranium.
Ladendorff, supra note 9, at 13, recognizes this rationale, but would favor
a legislative solution. See 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at § 218, who refers to
and agrees with this rationale; Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 339 n.12,
where cases germane to the oil placer analogy are cited.
236 F. 481 (8th Cir. 1916).
On this date, the President of the United States, under the authority vested
in him by the Pickett Act (enacted June 25, 1910), withdrew these lands
from mineral exploration and from all form of location and entry.
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"diligent prosecution of work leading to the discovery of oil
or gas."4 ' Although the issue in this case was whether or not
such work brought these lands within the first proviso of the
Pickett Act," the court's citation of Borgwardt v. McKittrick
Oil Co.' strongly suggests that the Grass Creek court would
have construed such work as coming within the standard of
"diligent prosecution of work leading to discovery" even if
the contest had been between two mineral claimants. More
recently, the "actual possession" and "working diligently
towards discovery" elements of pedis possessio were modified
by Kanab Uranium Corp. v. Consolidated Uranium Mines,"
involving a contest between two mineral claimants. The holding therein was that, because the one claimant was in possession under color of title, which flowed from location notices
having been filed and some purported discovery monuments
having been erected, the other claimant could not assert any
right "as [a citizen] of the United States to enter upon
[these] public domain [lands] for the purpose of prospecting
for, discovering, and developing valuable ores and minerals."" While this case is an unfortunate aberration," for
surely some form of "actual possession" and "diligent work
towards discovery" is essential, it does reveal that pedis possessio is far from being a static doctrine. The year following
Kanab, a New Mexico state court awarded pedis possessio
rights to an entire 640-acre section, thereby dealing the
claim-by-claim application of this doctrine a direct blow."
49. United States v. Grass Creek Oil & Gas Co., supra note 47, at 485, 487.
50. This proviso may be found in 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1970) and reads as follows:
Provided, That the rights of any person who, at the date of any
order of withdrawal, is a bona fide occupant or claimant of oilor gas-bearing lands and who, at such date, is in the diligent prosecution of work leading to the discovery of oil or gas, shall not
be affected or impaired by such order so long as such occupant
or claimant shall continue in diligent prosecution of said work....
51. 164 Cal. 650, 130 P. 417 (1913). This case contains the statement that
"[w]e do not mean to hold that such diligent prosecution of the work may
not include such actual preparation for the same as the bringing to the
claim of the materials necessary therefor." Id. at 661, 130 P. at 421. This
statement was quoted by the court in United States v. Grass Creek Oil &
Gas Co., supra note 47, at 487.
52. 227 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1955).
53. Id. at 436-37.
54. Ranchers Explor. & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., supra note 4, at 721-23, 729,
tactfully rejects Kanab, but the "Freudian slip" in Ranchers in referring
to Kanab as a Ninth Circuit, rather than a Tenth Circuit, decision may be
more suggestive of an outright disownment. Id. at 721.
55. See K.C.K. Mining Co. v. Senutovich, supra note 9; Comment, supra note
20, at 387.
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In that case the plaintiffs' work on 36 claims in one section
in McKinley County, New Mexico, consisted of merely having
staked; having dozed 18 cuts or scoops approximately eight
feet in depth, each on a boundary line between two claims;
having made an accurate survey, and having been in the
process of preparing a plat of the surface for drilling purposes. The court found that industry custom warranted such
an award.
Uranium occurs in erratic and unpredictable patterns beneath the surface of the earth, rendering
subterranean exploration on a single mining claim
with dimensions of 600 feet by 1,500 feet economically infeasible and the practice in the industry has
been to require control over a large group of claims,
usually one section, containing 640 acres, before laying out and conducting a drilling program for the
discovery of ore beneath the surface. Anyone engaged in the industry would be familiar with this
practice, and would know that a group of claims covering the surface of an entire section in a single
ownership is intended to be used in a single systematic discovery operation."
Those who oppose further evolution of this doctrine to
embrace a group or area application raise the spectre of
monopolization," speculation," and a substitution of the judiciary's judgment for that of the prospector and his geologist.5 9 Unquestionably, some would seek to exploit such an
evolution for monopolistic and speculative ends, and the judiciary must be alert to this. However, if a court, as in Mac
Guire v. Sturgis, establishes clear and meaningful guidelines
by which it will so apply pedis possessio, finds that the evidence satisfies these guidelines, and conditions its judgment
and decree upon the continued satisfaction of such guidelines,
these fears can be minimized, if not eliminated. In this regard,
it is important to remember that any judicial expansion of
this doctrine will affect only claimant-to-claimant relation56. K.C.K. Mining Co. v. Senutovich, supra note 9, Court's Finding of Fact
No. 7, page 3.
57. See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 345. This article best marshalls
the arguments against such an evolution.
58. Id. at 347.
59. Id. at 347, 372.
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ships; the federal government would not be hindered" from
challenging any claim based on the absence of discovery of a
valuable mineral6 1 or a failure to perform the required assessment work."2 Apart from these deterrents to monopoly and
speculaton, monopolistic practices would be subject to civil
and criminal sanctions available under the antitrust laws.
Also, any lack of diligent work towards discovery resulting
from any speculation would expose one relying on pedis possesio to peaceable entry by another and consequent litigation.
Nor, by accepting this task, would the judiciary in our adversary system be substituting its judgment for that of the
prospector and his geologist. Rather, if it be the trier of fact,
it would be weighing evidence introduced by contesting parties. As such, the court would be performing a traditional
role, one analogous to its role in a discovery contest between
two rival locators. In applying pedis possessio to current
uranium mining realities, the court likewise would be engaging in a traditional role of fashioning orders and granting
relief to fit a need long neglected by Congress.
60. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 9, at 342 n.19, suggest that the Forest
Service might be hindered in this respect. Yet, the Forest Service can
make its impact felt in challenging a patent application. See United States
v. Baranof Explor. & Dev. Co., 72 Interior Dec. 212 (1965); United States
v. Carlile, 67 Interior Dec. 417 (1960).
61. See Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Baranof Explor. & Dev. Co., supra note 60; United States v. Carlile,
supra note 60; Fiske, supra note 10, at 197-98. Withstanding such a challenge has been made even more difficult by United States v. Coleman, 390
U.S. 599 (1968), and Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969).
62. Disregarding Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U.S. 639,
646-47 (1935), Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970), at the very
least, gave the federal government authority to challenge any claim for
failure to properly perform past assessment work relative to leasing act
minerals located before the effective date of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, where the locator thereof receives notice of such challenge prior to
his resuming assessment work thereon. The Department of Interior's
proposed regulation section 3851.3(a) reveals that the Department interprets this case as embracing also locatable minerals and as permitting
any claim to be so challenged even when such work is resumed thereon
before receipt of the notice of challenge. 36 Fed. Reg. 13153 (July 15,
1971). Some might question the relevance of assessment work, a postdiscovery requirement, to pedis possessio, a pre-discovery right. Legally,
they would be correct. However, as a practical matter, mineral claimants
customarily locate, perform assessment work and file annual affidavits
thereof prior to discovery with the hope of protecting their claims in the
pre-discovery stage. Such location and assessment work and filing serve
notice to others that a prior claimant has intended to appropriate the
claims covered thereby. This notice is customarily respected, since others
desire similar respect to be reciprocated to their claims. Of course, those
who seek easy financial gain from practices more akin to extortion than
mineral exploration and development unscrupulously exploit the bona fide
mineral claimant's pre-discovery insecurity. See Comment, supra note 20, at
888.
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